EMPLOYER MORAL HAZARD IN PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS: THE EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURE SUBJECTIVITY AND JUSTIFICATION ON EMPLOYER OPPORTUNISM

Authors

  • Sevara Umarjonova Sharda University Uzbekistan Author

Keywords:

Keywords: employer moral hazard, subjective performance evaluation, employer opportunism, managerial discretion, accountability, justification, compensation fairness, performance management.

Abstract

The increasing complexity of organizational performance management has intensified concerns about employer moral hazard in employee evaluation and compensation decisions. Although subjective performance measures allow managers to assess qualitative contributions that cannot be captured through objective indicators, managerial discretion may also create opportunities for opportunistic behavior. This study examines how performance measure subjectivity and justification requirements influence employer opportunism, perceived accountability, and compensation fairness. A qualitative narrative review of international academic literature was conducted, focusing on agency theory, performance measurement systems, managerial decision-making, and accountability mechanisms. The reviewed evidence indicates that subjective evaluations may increase the risk of biased compensation decisions when managers have personal financial incentives and limited accountability. However, requiring managers to justify their evaluation decisions can reduce certain forms of bias by encouraging greater attention to supporting evidence. The effectiveness of justification depends on organizational incentives, the audience receiving the explanation, and the potential for motivated reasoning. The study concludes that combining objective performance indicators, structured subjective assessments, and transparent justification procedures provides a promising framework for improving fairness and reducing employer moral hazard.

References

1.Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1994). Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1125–1156. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118358

2.Fisher, J. G., Maines, L. A., Peffer, S. A., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2005). An experimental investigation of employer discretion in employee performance evaluation and compensation. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 563–583. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.563

3.Ittner, C. D., Larcker, D. F., & Meyer, M. W. (2003). Subjectivity and the weighting of performance measures: Evidence from a balanced scorecard. The Accounting Review, 78(3), 725–758. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.725

4.Moers, F. (2005). Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: The impact of diversity and subjectivity. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30(1), 67–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2003.11.001

5.Bellavance, F., Landry, S., & Schiehll, E. (2013). Procedural justice in managerial performance evaluation: Effects of subjectivity, relationship quality, and voice opportunity. The British Accounting Review, 45(3), 149–166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2013.06.013

6.Lang, M. (2019). Communicating subjective evaluations. Journal of Economic Theory, 179, 163–199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.012

7.Maske, M. K., Sohn, M., & Hirsch, B. (2021). How managerial accountability mitigates a halo effect in managers' ex-post bonus adjustments. Management Accounting Research, 51, 100738. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2021.100738

8.Miller, C. A. (2024). Employer moral hazard in performance evaluations: The effects of performance measure subjectivity and justification on employer opportunism [Doctoral dissertation, University of South Florida]. USF Scholar Commons. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10822/

9.Bauch, K. A., & Weißenberger, B. E. (2025). The effects of accountability on favoritism in subjective performance evaluations: An eye-tracking study. Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 77, 915–944. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41471-025-00231-8

10.de Janvry, A., He, G., Sadoulet, E., Wang, S., & Zhang, Q. (2023). Subjective performance evaluation, influence activities, and bureaucratic work behavior: Evidence from China. American Economic Review, 113(3), 766–799. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211207

11.Bol, J. C. (2011). The determinants and performance effects of managers' performance evaluation biases. The Accounting Review, 86(5), 1549–1575. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10099

Downloads

Published

2026-10-13 — Updated on 2026-10-13

Versions