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JALALID-DIN MANGUBERDI'S TACTICS IN FIGHTING AGAINST THE MONGOLS

SHARIPOV L.H.,
Senior Lecturer at the
Institute of Ground Forces.
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Abstract: This article analyzes the military operations and tactical methods of the last ruler of the Khorezmshahs, Jaloliddin Manguberdi, against the Mongol invasion in the first quarter of the 13th century. It highlights the mobility of Jaloliddin Manguberdi's troops, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, effective use of the terrain, rapid maneuver, change of direction of attack, centralized command, and the use of retreat as a strategic tool. The methods used by the Khorezmshah's army against the Mongol military system are analyzed using the examples of the Battle of Parvan, the Battle of the Indus River, and the Battle of Isfahan in 1227. The study shows that Jaloliddin's main advantage was not to compete with the traditional mobile cavalry of the Mongols in the open field, but to create conditions that limited their freedom of movement, to strike at a convenient time, and to ensure the rapid movement of the army.
Keywords: Jalaluddin Manguberdi, Khorezmshahs, Mongols, Genghis Khan, Battle of Parvan, Indus River, Battle of Isfahan, military tactics, maneuver, cavalry, battlefield.

Introduction

In the history of military-political events in Central Asia and the Middle East at the beginning of the 13th century, Jalaluddin Manguberdi occupies a special place (Figure 1). As the last ruler of the Khorezmshah dynasty, he fought against the Mongol invasion in 1220–1231. In a situation where the main part of the Khorezmshah state was occupied by the Mongols, Jalaluddin tried to reunite the scattered troops and continue the resistance. He gathered forces around Ghazni and won a major victory over the Mongol army at Parwan in 1221. Later, he retreated to India and tried to restore his political and military position in Western Iran and the Caucasus. An important feature of Jalaluddin's struggle against the Mongols was that he did not try to directly repeat the military superiority of the Mongols, but rather to limit their tactical capabilities. In particular, the use of terrain, the attraction of mobile troops to a certain area, and the counterattack at a convenient time played an important role in his military activities.




Figure 1. Jaloliddin Manguberdi

1. The main features of the military tactics of Jaloliddin Manguberdi. Jaloliddin Manguberdi's tactics can be divided into several main directions:

1. use of terrain;
2. maintaining the mobility of the army;

3. putting the enemy's strong cavalry in an unfavorable position;4. coordinating the center and wings;
5. rapid counterattack;
6. orderly retreat when necessary;
7. splitting the enemy's forces;
8. maintaining a high level of army morale.
The most striking example of these methods is seen in the Battle of Parvan in 1221 [1].
2. The Battle of Parwan - the most striking example of Jalaluddin's tactics In 1221, Jalaluddin gathered a large army near Ghazni.
It included, along with the Khorezmians, Turkish and local Afghan forces. The Mongols sent an army under the command of Shigi Kutugu against Jalaluddin. The battle at Parwan was Jalaluddin's most famous victory over the Mongols.
The terrain was decisive in the Battle of Parwan. Modern studies note that the battlefield was uneven, rocky, and difficult to move, which reduced the mobility of the Mongol cavalry.
Here, Jalaluddin's important tactical decision was to put the enemy in an environment where he could not fully use his most powerful weapon, the highly mobile cavalry.
From this point of view, the tactical formula in the Battle of Parvan can be expressed as follows:
enemy's strong point → attracting to an unfavorable environment → limiting mobility → dividing into parts → counterattacking.
This approach made it possible to reduce the Mongols' usual advantage in rapid movement and maneuver [2].
3. Use of cavalry and infantry combat actions.
Jalaluddin's army did not consist only of cavalry warriors. There is information that in the conditions of the Battle of Parvan, the tactic of dismounting part of the mounted archers and fighting on foot was used. This method served to reduce the superiority of the Mongol cavalry in the uneven and rocky terrain.

This situation demonstrates an important aspect of Jalaluddin's tactics: adapting the type of troops to the conditions of the battlefield. That is, he did not try to use the cavalry in the same way in all situations. On the contrary, he retained the ability to use infantry archers when the terrain required it, and to strike with cavalry when the situation was favorable.
4. Using the wings and enveloping the enemy.
The wings of the army were of particular importance in the Battle of Parvan. Modern studies show that Jalaluddin's army was divided into wings and subsequently carried out enveloping actions against the Mongols. This tactic deprived the Mongol troops of the opportunity to operate in one place for a long time with an advantage [3].
The task of the wings was conditionally:
to put pressure on the enemy's wings; to limit his ability to maneuver;
to ensure the movement of the main forces;
to counterattack at a convenient time;
and so on.
In this regard, maneuver and countermaneuver played an important role in Jalaluddin's tactics.
5. Studying Mongol tactics.
The Mongol army's strengths were rapid movement, cavalry archers, false retreats, flank attacks, and forcing the enemy to move in open terrain.
Jalaluddin's significant achievement was that he did not act as an opponent who was completely unfamiliar with Mongol military tactics. The events at Parwan demonstrate his ability to understand

enemy tactics and find an appropriate response to them. Sources cite information that at Parwan the Mongols even tried to use false warriors to make their ranks appear larger, but Jalaluddin did not succumb to this tactical trick [4].

Thus, another important element of Jalaluddin's tactics was:

to understand the enemy's tactical tactics in advance and take countermeasures.

6. The strategic problem after the victory.

Although the Battle of Parwan demonstrated Jalaluddin's military skill, this victory was not fully developed strategically.

There is information in the sources that after the battle, disagreements arose within the army regarding the division of spoils. These internal conflicts weakened the unity of the army. Modern studies also emphasize that the disruption of the internal unity of the army after the victory at Parvan negatively affected Jalaluddin's subsequent opportunities.

This situation leads to an important military-historical conclusion:

in order for a tactical victory to turn into a strategic result, the organizational and political unity of the army must be preserved.

This is where Jalaluddin's main problem appears. Although he was able to inflict a serious blow on the Mongols in individual battles, he encountered great difficulties in organizing a long-term united front against them.

7. Battle and maneuver along the Indus River.

After Parwan, Genghis Khan mobilized his main forces against Jalalid. Jalaluddin's army was forced to retreat towards the Indus River. In 1221, his army suffered a heavy defeat in a riverside battle, and Jalaluddin managed to cross the river with his horse and leave for India.

This event can be evaluated not only as an example of courage, but also in terms of operational mobility and the desire to save the army. That is, in a situation where there was a threat of defeat, Jalaluddin tried to save the opportunity for further resistance instead of losing the army and statehood completely [5].

Therefore, the movement along the Indus River:

it can be evaluated as a maneuver to preserve forces in the face of defeat and enter a new strategic area.

8. Battle of Isfahan in 1227 Jalaluddin later tried to restore his political and military position in Iran. When the Mongols reappeared in Central Iran in 1227, Jalaluddin fought them near Isfahan. Although the outcome of this conflict was officially decided in favor of the Mongols, their losses were so great that the Mongols were forced to retreat from Iran towards Transoxania. This battle shows another important feature of Jalaluddin's tactics: inflicting heavy losses on the enemy even if he is not completely defeated and restricting his further movements. From this point of view, it is not enough to evaluate Jalaluddin's military actions only by the criteria of "victory or defeat". Tactical efficiency should also be evaluated by the losses of the enemy, stopping his movement and temporarily gaining the initiative [6].

9. Mobility is the main principle of Jalaluddin's tactics.

Jalaluddin Manguberdi was constantly on the move in the fight against the Mongols. He conducted military and political activities in the regions of Ghazni, Afghanistan, India, Iran, Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. This indicates that mobile defense prevailed in his tactics, not static defense.

The main tasks of mobile defense:

not to receive a direct enemy attack;

to retreat to a favorable area;

to move the enemy to a long distance;

to weaken his supply and communication capabilities;
to wait for a favorable time for a counterattack.
These elements were manifested to varying degrees in Jalaluddin's fight against the Mongols.
10. The political factor and the problem of military coalitions.
No matter how effective Jalaluddin's military tactics were, his strategic capabilities were limited by political fragmentation.

Modern studies note that Jalaluddin tried to unite various states and rulers against the Mongols, that is, to support the military struggle with a diplomatic coalition. However, this coalition could not become a stable and unified military force [7].
Encyclopedic studies also emphasize that Jalaluddin had the opportunity to unite the rulers of Iran, Iraq and Anatolia to effectively resist the Mongols, but the conflicts between the local rulers prevented the implementation of such a plan.
Thus, in Jalaluddin's experience, the conclusion that:
tactical skill + political unity = strategic result is of great **importance**.

Conclusion

Jalaluddin Manguberdi's military campaign against the Mongols is one of the most important pages in the military history of Central Asia of the 13th century. His tactics were based on limiting the enemy's strengths and creating favorable conditions, rather than engaging in a simple open field battle with the superior cavalry of the Mongols.
Based on the research, the following main features of Jalaluddin's tactics can be distinguished:
Effective use of the terrain. In Parwan, the uneven and complex terrain reduced the mobility of the Mongol cavalry.
Maintaining the mobility of the army. When enemy pressure intensified, Jalaluddin sought to retreat to new areas and conserve strength for further resistance.
Adaptation to the enemy's tactical methods. He adapted the battlefield and the formation of the army to the mobile cavalry tactics of the Mongols.
Use of flanks and counterattacks. In Parwan, the coordinated movement of army units served to break the Mongol ranks.
Seizing the initiative on the battlefield. In some cases, Jalaluddin took the initiative instead of waiting for the enemy to move.
The difficulty of turning a tactical victory into a strategic result. After the victory at Parwan, internal conflicts within the army significantly weakened his military capabilities.
The need to combine military and political factors. For Jalaluddin's long-term success against the Mongols, not only a strong army was necessary, but also a stable political coalition.In general, Jalaluddin Manguberdi's military legacy shows that in the fight against a numerically and resourcefully superior opponent, rational use of space, mobility, studying the enemy's tactical methods, and choosing the right time to unite forces and strike are important factors.
At the same time, his experience shows that there is a big difference between tactical and strategic victory. While the victory at Parwan demonstrated Jalaluddin's military potential, subsequent events show that the lack of political unity and long-term strategic planning prevented him from fully translating tactical success into a full result.

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