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The China Discount Revisited: Sector Structure, State Ownership and the Valuation Gap between the Largest US and Chinese Listed Firms

Cross-Sectional Evidence from 200 Companies, 2026

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Abstract: Rising geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China has renewed interest in whether investors systematically value Chinese companies below comparable American ones, the so-called "China discount". This paper tests the size and sources of the discount using a hand-assembled cross-section of the 100 largest listed companies in each country by market capitalisation, with trailing-twelve-month earnings and revenue retrieved in October 2026. The median price-to-earnings ratio is 9.1 for Chinese firms and 18.3 for US firms; the aggregate ratio is 9.0 versus 20.5. Earnings margins are statistically indistinguishable (median 22.3% versus 23.1%). A decomposition shows that 45% of the aggregate gap reflects sector composition, since Chinese market value is concentrated in banks and energy and US value in technology; the remaining 55% reflects lower valuations within the same sectors. Controlling for sector, size and profitability, Chinese firms trade at P/E ratios about 49.5% lower ($p < 0.001$). Two further results qualify common narratives. First, state ownership carries no significant discount once sector and size are held constant: the raw SOE discount is a composition effect. Second, the discount is concentrated outside technology. Chinese technology firms trade at 23.6% below US peers (not significant), against 50.6% in other sectors (interaction $p = 0.016$). The findings are consistent with a country-level institutional and geopolitical risk premium that investors waive in strategically favoured sectors. We discuss implications for multinational strategy, portfolio allocation and emerging-market policymakers.

Keywords: China discount; firm valuation; state-owned enterprises; US–China decoupling; institution-based view; geopolitical risk; international business

1. Introduction

The economic relationship between the United States and China has moved from interdependence towards managed rivalry. Successive rounds of tariffs since 2018, export controls on advanced semiconductors, investment screening and the threat of forced delisting of Chinese companies from US exchanges have made geopolitics a first-order consideration for firms and investors operating across the two largest economies (Fajgelbaum et al., 2020; Witt et al., 2023).[1] A central question for international business is how these institutional and political differences are reflected in the value of firms.

[1]**Decoupling.** The partial disentangling of economic linkages between two economies, through tariffs, export controls, investment screening and supply-chain relocation, driven by geopolitical rivalry rather than by commercial considerations alone (Witt et al., 2023).

Practitioners commonly refer to a "China discount": Chinese companies appear to trade at lower valuation multiples than comparable firms elsewhere. The size of the gap is striking. In our data, the 100 largest US companies are together worth about 6.7 times as much as the 100 largest Chinese companies.[2] Yet the sources of the discount remain contested. It may reflect differences in profitability, the sector composition of the two markets, state ownership, the listing venue, or a broader premium for institutional and geopolitical risk. These explanations carry very different implications. If the discount simply reflects China's bank-heavy market structure, it says little about Chinese firms as such. If it persists within sectors and among private firms, it points to a country-level risk premium rooted in institutions.

This paper decomposes the China discount using a matched cross-section of the 100 largest listed companies in each country, observed in October 2026. We ask four questions. Do large Chinese firms trade at lower earnings multiples than US firms? Does the gap survive controls for sector, size and profitability? Does state ownership explain it? And is it uniform across sectors, or smaller in the strategic technology sectors that Chinese industrial policy favours? We combine descriptive comparison, a sector-mix decomposition and regressions with sector fixed effects.

The paper makes three contributions. First, it provides up-to-date, transparent evidence on the size of the US–China valuation gap at the very top of both markets, at a time of intense geopolitical tension. Second, it shows that roughly half of the aggregate gap is a composition effect and that the widely cited SOE discount disappears within sectors. Third, it documents a sector asymmetry, a near-absence of discount in technology, which links firm valuation to the international business literature on strategic sectors and state capitalism. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses, Section 3 presents the data and methods, Section 4 reports the results, Section 5 discusses implications and limitations, and Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses

2.1 Institutions, risk and firm value across borders

Valuation theory links a firm's earnings multiple to the return investors require and to expected growth (Gordon, 1959; Damodaran, 2012).[3] Anything that raises perceived risk or lowers the credibility of future cash flows reduces multiples. International business scholarship emphasises that such risks are shaped by institutions. The institution-based view[4] holds that formal and informal institutions determine the rules under which firms compete and the security of their returns (Peng, 2003; Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008). Weak investor protection lowers corporate valuations (La Porta et al., 2002), and uncertainty about government policy raises required returns and depresses stock prices (Pástor and Veronesi, 2012; Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016). Geopolitical risk has similar effects (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022).[5] Foreign investors also face an

[2] **Size gap.** The combined market value of the 100 largest US firms (about US$55 trillion) is roughly 6.7 times that of the 100 largest Chinese firms (about US$8.2 trillion), although China's GDP is about two-thirds of the US level at market exchange rates.

[3] **Price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio.** Market capitalisation divided by earnings. It tells how many dollars investors pay for one dollar of current annual earnings. Other things equal, a lower P/E reflects higher required returns (greater perceived risk) or lower expected growth. In the Gordon (1959) growth model, P/E = payout ratio ÷ (r − g), where r is the required return and g the expected growth rate.

[4] **Institution-based view.** A perspective in international business, associated with Mike W. Peng, that treats formal institutions (laws, regulations, property rights) and informal institutions (norms, relationships) as central drivers of firm strategy and performance, alongside industry and firm resources.

[5] **Geopolitical risk.** The threat of, or actual, wars, terrorist acts and tensions between states that disrupt international relations. Caldara and Iacoviello (2022) measure it with a newspaper-based index and show that higher geopolitical risk depresses investment and stock prices.

analogue of the liability of foreignness[6] (Zaheer, 1995) when holding assets in an unfamiliar or politically exposed jurisdiction.

China's institutional setting differs from that of the United States along precisely these dimensions. The United States is the archetypal liberal market economy,[7] whereas China combines markets with extensive state ownership and policy direction, a configuration described as state capitalism[8] (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014; Lardy, 2019). Research on China's stock market documents a long-standing disconnect between economic growth and equity returns (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005), although Carpenter, Lu and Whitelaw (2021) show that Chinese share prices have become increasingly informative about firm fundamentals. We therefore expect:

H1. Large Chinese listed firms trade at lower earnings multiples than large US listed firms.

H2. The difference persists after controlling for sector, firm size and profitability.

2.2 State ownership

State-owned enterprises[9] pursue political and social objectives alongside profit, are exposed to political intervention, and may suffer agency problems between the state as owner and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Bruton et al., 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014). In the Fortune Global 500, Chinese SOEs show markedly lower profitability and return on assets than private Chinese firms (Kennedy, 2020). Investors may therefore discount SOE shares:

H3. Among Chinese firms, state-owned enterprises trade at lower multiples than private firms, controlling for sector and size.

2.3 Strategic sectors

Decoupling has not affected all industries equally. Governments increasingly single out strategic sectors[10], such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and telecommunications equipment, for protection and support (Petricevic and Teece, 2019). For Chinese technology firms, US export controls are a threat, but they also create a protected domestic market and strong state backing for import substitution. Investors may therefore price Chinese technology firms closer to global peers, because policy support offsets some of the country risk:

H4. The China discount is smaller in the technology sector than in other sectors.

We also examine, as an exploratory question, whether the listing venue (mainland A-shares versus offshore listings in Hong Kong or the United States)[11] is associated with different multiples,

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[6]**Liability of foreignness.** The additional costs a firm incurs when operating outside its home country, such as unfamiliarity, discrimination and political hostility (Zaheer, 1995). By extension, foreign investors face analogous costs when holding assets subject to an unfamiliar or unpredictable institutional regime.

[7]**Varieties of capitalism.** A comparative framework (Hall and Soskice, 2001) that distinguishes liberal market economies, coordinated through markets (the United States), from economies coordinated by other institutions. Later work extended it to state-led variants such as China.

[8]**State capitalism.** An economic system in which the state is a major owner and director of large enterprises while relying on markets for allocation (Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014). China is the paradigmatic contemporary case.

[9]**State-owned enterprise (SOE).** In this paper, a firm whose controlling shareholder is a central or local government entity (for example, SASAC, the Ministry of Finance, Central Huijin or a provincial state-capital company). Firms without a clear state controller are classified as private; ambiguous cases are excluded from ownership tests.

[10]**Strategic sectors.** Industries that governments treat as critical to national security and technological leadership, such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, telecommunications and advanced manufacturing (Petricevic and Teece, 2019). China has supported these sectors through industrial policy since the *Made in China 2025* programme (2015).

[11]**A-shares, H-shares and ADRs.** A-shares are shares of mainland Chinese companies traded in renminbi on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. H-shares and other Hong Kong listings are traded in Hong Kong dollars. American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)

given the historical A-share premium (Fernald and Rogers, 2002).

3. Data and Methods

3.1 Sample

The sample consists of the 100 largest listed companies headquartered in the United States and the 100 largest headquartered in mainland China, ranked by market capitalisation[12] in the country rankings of CompaniesMarketCap[13] on 22 October 2026. For each company we matched trailing-twelve-month (TTM)[14] earnings and revenue from the same provider's country rankings by earnings and by revenue (the top 200 in each), all in US dollars. Earnings were available for 89 US and 89 Chinese firms, and revenue for 78 and 79. The 11 firms missing in each country are mainly loss-making or low-earning high-growth firms, such as Palantir, CrowdStrike and Intel in the United States and Cambricon, Moore Threads and Baidu in China.[15] Because both samples lose firms of the same type, the comparison is broadly balanced. Table 1 summarises the sample.

Table 1. Sample construction and coverage[16]

	United States	China
Firms in top 100 by market capitalisation	100	100
…with TTM earnings available (P/E sample)	89	89
…with earnings and revenue available (margin sample)	75	76
Combined market capitalisation (US$ trillion)	55.2	8.2
Median market capitalisation (US$ billion)	232.3	41.7
Share of the 10 largest firms in combined value	52.9%	41.1%
Median TTM earnings (US$ billion, P/E sample)	12.99	4.85
Chinese SOEs / private / ambiguous	—	48 / 43 / 9

Each firm was assigned to one of nine sectors by the author following the Global Industry Classification Standard (technology; communication and internet; consumer; health care; banks; other financials; energy and materials; industrials; utilities and real estate). Chinese firms were classified as state-owned when their controlling shareholder is a government entity, and as private otherwise. Nine firms with dispersed or contested control (for example, SMIC, CXMT and China

are certificates traded in the United States that represent shares of a foreign company. Historically, A-shares have often traded at a premium to the same firm's offshore shares (Fernald and Rogers, 2002).

[12] **Market capitalisation.** The number of shares outstanding multiplied by the current share price; for multi-class or multi-listed firms, data providers aggregate all share classes.

[13] **CompaniesMarketCap.** A public financial-data aggregator (companiesmarketcap.com) that ranks listed companies worldwide by market capitalisation, revenue, earnings and other indicators, with country-level rankings. Figures are converted to US dollars and updated daily.

[14] **TTM (trailing twelve months).** Financial figures summed over the four most recently reported quarters, which allows comparison of firms with different fiscal year-ends.

[15] **Coverage bias.** Firms with negative or very small earnings have undefined or extreme P/E ratios and do not appear in the earnings rankings used. They are mainly high-growth technology firms in both countries. Excluding them lowers measured P/E in both samples.

[16] Source: author's calculations based on CompaniesMarketCap (2026), data retrieved on 22 October 2026.

Pacific Insurance) are excluded from ownership tests. Listing venue is coded as A-share (Shanghai or Shenzhen ticker) or offshore (Hong Kong or US ticker).

3.2 Methods

The main outcome is the P/E ratio, market capitalisation divided by TTM earnings. We also report the earnings margin (earnings ÷ revenue) and the price-to-sales ratio. Country differences are tested with the Mann–Whitney U test.[17] The aggregate P/E gap is decomposed into a sector-composition effect and a within-sector effect,[18] using earnings-weighted sector multiples. The core specification is

$$\ln(P/E)_i = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{China}_i + \gamma \cdot \ln(\text{Earnings})_i + \delta \cdot X_i + \mu_{s(i)} + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where China is an indicator for Chinese firms, X contains the earnings margin in some specifications, and μ are sector fixed effects.[19] β measures the conditional China discount in log points.[20] Within the Chinese subsample we replace China with SOE and A-share indicators (H3), and we add a China × Technology interaction to test H4. All models are estimated by OLS with HC3 robust standard errors.[21]

4. Results

4.1 Market structure

The two markets differ sharply in composition (Figure 1). Technology accounts for 43% of the combined value of the 100 largest US firms but only 18% in China. Banks account for 28% in China but only 3% in the United States, and energy and materials for 11% versus 3%. Sixteen of China's 100 largest listed firms are banks, against five in the United States. Because banks and commodity producers trade at low multiples everywhere, this composition alone will lower China's aggregate valuation.

[17] **Mann–Whitney U test.** A non-parametric test of whether values in one group tend to be larger than in another (Mann and Whitney, 1947). It does not assume normality and is robust to the extreme values common in valuation ratios.


[18] **Decomposition of the aggregate gap.** In the spirit of the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition, the aggregate P/E difference is split into a part caused by different sector weights (*composition* or *mix* effect) and a part caused by different valuations within the same sectors (*within* effect), using a counterfactual that applies US sector multiples to China's sector mix.

[19] **Sector fixed effects.** A separate intercept for each sector. These intercepts absorb all valuation differences common to the firms in a sector (for example, structurally lower bank multiples), so the China coefficient is identified only from comparisons of US and Chinese firms within the same sector.

[20] **Interpreting log coefficients.** When the dependent variable is ln(P/E), a coefficient β on a 0/1 indicator implies a proportional difference of $(e^{\beta} - 1) \times 100$ per cent. A coefficient of −0.65, for example, means a P/E about 48 per cent lower.

[21] **HC3 robust standard errors.** Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with the small-sample correction proposed by MacKinnon and White (1985), refining White (1980). They remain valid when the error variance differs across firms.

Figure 1. Sector composition of the 100 largest US and Chinese listed firms (share of combined market capitalisation)[22]



4.2 Valuation and profitability

Table 2 and Figure 2 compare valuations. The median Chinese firm trades at 9.1 times earnings, half the US median of 18.3 (Mann–Whitney $p < 0.001$). The median price-to-sales ratio is 1.83 against 4.40. Profitability, however, is almost identical. The median earnings margin is 22.3% in China and 23.1% in the United States ($p = 0.89$). Investors pay roughly half as much for a dollar of Chinese earnings, although large Chinese firms convert revenue into earnings at about the same rate as American firms.

Table 2. Valuation and profitability of the largest US and Chinese firms[23]

Indicator	United States	China	Test
Median P/E (interquartile range)	18.3 (13.4–26.9)	9.1 (6.3–18.1)	Mann–Whitney $p < 0.001$
Aggregate P/E (Σ market cap ÷ Σ earnings)	20.5	9.0	—
Median price-to-sales ratio	4.40	1.83	—
Median earnings margin	23.1%	22.3%	Mann–Whitney $p = 0.89$
Firms (P/E sample)	89	89	

[22] Source: author's calculations based on CompaniesMarketCap (2026).

[23] Source: author's calculations based on CompaniesMarketCap (2026). Earnings are TTM earnings as reported by the provider, defined identically for both countries.




Figure 2. Distribution of price-to-earnings ratios[24]

4.3 Composition versus within-sector valuation

Figure 3 and Table 3 compare median multiples within sectors. The pattern is uneven. In technology and health care, Chinese and US medians are almost identical. In communication and internet and in consumer businesses the gap is moderate, at about 18–19%. It is largest in industrials, other financials, energy and materials, and utilities and real estate, where Chinese firms trade at roughly half the US multiple. Applying US sector multiples to China's sector mix gives a counterfactual aggregate P/E of 15.3. Of the aggregate gap of 11.5 points (20.5 versus 9.0), 5.2 points (45%) are therefore attributable to sector composition and 6.3 points (55%) to lower valuations within sectors.

Table 3. Median P/E by sector

Sector	Firms (US / China)	US median P/E	China median P/E	China vs. US
Technology	21 / 13	24.2	24.0	-1%
Health care	14 / 5	25.3	25.5	1%
Communication & Internet	7 / 4	13.2	10.8	-18%
Consumer	13 / 15	18.1	14.8	-19%
Banks	5 / 16	9.0	5.8	-36%
Other financials	12 / 14	14.6	7.2	-51%
Energy & materials	7 / 10	12.0	7.1	-41%
Industrials	8 / 9	21.7	10.1	-53%
Utilities & real estate	2 / 3	18.8	8.2	-57%

[24] Source: author's calculations based on CompaniesMarketCap (2026).




Figure 3. Median P/E ratio by sector, United States and China

4.4 Regression results

Table 4 reports the regressions. Without controls (column 1), Chinese firms trade at 46.7% lower P/E ratios. Adding sector fixed effects and firm size (column 2) leaves the discount essentially unchanged at 47.6%. Adding the earnings margin (column 3) raises it slightly to 49.5%; the margin itself is insignificant. H1 and H2 are supported: the China discount is large and is not explained by sector, size or profitability. Larger firms trade at somewhat lower multiples in both countries, as expected from slower expected growth at scale. Figure 4 visualises the result. At any level of earnings, Chinese firms lie well below US firms.

Table 4. Determinants of ln(P/E): OLS estimates[25]

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
China	-0.629***	-0.646***	-0.684***	-0.705***	
	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.118)	(0.105)	
China × Technology				0.437**	
				(0.179)	
SOE					-0.072
					(0.169)
A-share listing					0.129
					(0.137)
ln(Earnings)		-0.167***	-0.143**	-0.146***	-0.155**
		(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.070)
Earnings margin			0.176		

[25] Source: author's estimates. HC3 robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Column (5) excludes nine Chinese firms with ambiguous ownership

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			(0.261)		
Sector fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	Margin sample	All	China only
Observations	178	178	151	178	81
Adjusted R^2	0.196	0.568	0.544	0.580	0.582

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


Figure 4. Market capitalisation and earnings of the largest US and Chinese firms[26]

State ownership (H3). Raw medians suggest a large SOE discount: Chinese SOEs trade at a median P/E of 7.5 against 17.1 for private firms. Once sector and size are controlled (column 5), however, the SOE coefficient is small and insignificant (-0.072, p = 0.67). The apparent SOE discount arises because SOEs dominate the low-multiple sectors, namely banks, energy, utilities and construction. Within sectors, state-owned and private Chinese firms are valued similarly. H3 is not supported. The A-share coefficient is also insignificant (p = 0.35), so we find no evidence that listing venue drives valuations among these large firms.

Strategic sectors (H4). The China × Technology interaction is positive and significant (0.437, p = 0.016). Outside technology, Chinese firms trade 50.6% below comparable US firms. Within technology, the implied discount is only 23.6% and is not statistically different from zero (p = 0.14). H4 is supported. Investors value Chinese semiconductor, optical-communication and hardware firms, such as CXMT, Zhongji Innolight, NAURA and SMIC, close to global multiples, while applying a large discount to legacy and state-dominated sectors.

4.5 Robustness

Table 5 reports three robustness checks. The Chinese earnings ranking extends to smaller firms than the US ranking, so we first restrict both samples to firms with earnings of at least US$3.15 billion, the US cut-off (89 US and 60 Chinese firms). The discount rises slightly to 50.5%. Excluding all financial firms, whose earnings and multiples are structurally different, leaves it at 47.6%. Comparing only private Chinese firms with US firms still yields a discount of 43.5% (p < 0.001), confirming that the gap is not driven by state ownership.

[26] Lines are OLS fits of ln(market capitalisation) on ln(earnings) by country.

Table 5. Robustness of the China discount[27]

Specification	China coefficient (SE)	Implied discount	N
Baseline (Table 4, column 2)	-0.646* * * (0.101)	47.6%	178
Common earnings floor ≥ US$3.15 bn	-0.704* * * (0.107)	50.5%	149
Excluding banks and other financials	-0.646* * * (0.133)	47.6%	131
Private Chinese firms only vs. US firms	-0.570* * * (0.157)	43.5%	123

5. Discussion

Interpreting the discount. Three results together point towards a country-level risk premium rather than firm-level weaknesses. Chinese firms are as profitable as US firms, private Chinese firms are discounted almost as much as SOEs, and the discount survives sector and size controls. This pattern fits the institution-based view: investors appear to price the institutional environment in which the earnings are generated. Relevant features include policy unpredictability, the risk of regulatory campaigns such as the 2020–2022 platform crackdown, constraints on capital mobility, and the geopolitical exposure created by US–China decoupling (Pástor and Veronesi, 2012; Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022; Witt et al., 2023). Lower expected growth as China's economy slows may also contribute; our data cannot fully separate a risk premium from growth expectations.

The strategic-sector exception. The absence of a discount in technology is the most distinctive finding. It suggests that state support and protected domestic demand, the very forces that geopolitical rivalry has intensified, can offset country risk in sectors the state prioritises (Petricevic and Teece, 2019). Decoupling thus appears to redistribute valuation within China, towards strategic technology and away from legacy sectors, rather than lowering all Chinese valuations uniformly.

Implications for international business. For **multinational managers**, the results imply that the cost of equity capital for Chinese partners, competitors and acquisition targets is substantially higher outside strategic sectors. This affects joint-venture bargaining, cross-border M&A pricing and the attractiveness of equity-based entry modes. For **investors**, half of the headline discount is a sector-mix artefact, so comparisons of aggregate index multiples overstate how "cheap" Chinese firms are. For policymakers in emerging markets, including Central Asian economies that trade with both powers, the findings show that institutional credibility is capitalised directly into firm values. Reforms that improve the predictability of regulation and investor protection may matter more for corporate valuations than ownership changes alone.

Limitations. The study is a single cross-section; it identifies associations, not causal effects, and cannot show how the discount evolved with specific policy events. Earnings are provider-reported TTM figures, whose exact definition (for example, pre-tax or net) is not documented but is identical for both countries; TTM earnings can also include one-off items such as investment gains, which distort individual ratios (we therefore rely on medians, logs and robust standard errors). Sector and ownership classifications were made by the author and may contain errors in borderline cases. The exclusion of loss-making firms removes some of the highest-valued US and Chinese technology companies. Future research should build a panel around tariff and export-control events and add forward-looking growth measures.

[27] Source: author's estimates. All models include ln(Earnings) and sector fixed effects; HC3 robust standard errors.

6. Conclusion

Using a matched sample of the 100 largest listed firms in the United States and China, this paper finds that Chinese firms trade at about half the earnings multiple of US firms despite similar profitability. About 45% of the aggregate gap reflects China's bank- and energy-heavy market structure. The remainder is a within-sector discount of roughly 48% that is not explained by size, profitability, state ownership or listing venue, and that largely disappears in technology. The China discount is therefore best understood not as an SOE problem or a profitability problem, but as a country-level institutional and geopolitical risk premium that investors waive where the Chinese state concentrates its strategic support. As US–China rivalry continues to reshape global business, how this premium evolves will be a key indicator of how markets price the costs of decoupling.

Appendix A. The 25 largest firms in each country

Country	Rank	Company	Sector	Market cap (US$ bn)	TTM earnings (US$ bn)	P/E	Ownership
US	1	NVIDIA	Technology	5,306	230.2	23.0	
US	2	Apple	Technology	4,953	154.8	32.0	
US	3	Alphabet	Communication & Internet	4,027	301.5	13.4	
US	4	Microsoft	Technology	3,931	165.9	23.7	
US	5	Amazon	Consumer	2,816	118.0	23.9	
US	6	SpaceX	Industrials	2,097	—	—	
US	7	Meta Platforms	Communication & Internet	1,788	89.5	20.0	
US	8	Broadcom	Technology	1,607	43.6	36.9	
US	9	Tesla	Consumer	1,507	5.5	271.5	
US	10	Berkshire Hathaway	Other financials	1,159	88.8	13.1	
US	11	Eli Lilly	Health care	1,131	33.6	33.7	
US	12	Micron Technology	Technology	1,021	59.3	17.2	
US	13	Walmart	Consumer	935	31.7	29.5	
US	14	AMD	Technology	895	7.7	116.4	
US	15	JPMorgan Chase	Banks	889	83.9	10.6	
US	16	Visa	Other financials	762	26.9	28.3	
US	17	Exxon Mobil	Energy & materials	729	45.4	16.1	
US	18	Johnson & Johnson	Health care	620	26.2	23.6	

Country	Rank	Company	Sector	Market cap (US$ bn)	TTM earnings (US$ bn)	P/E	Ownership
US	19	Mastercard	Other financials	543	20.2	26.9	
US	20	AbbVie	Health care	510	8.7	58.6	
US	21	Intel	Technology	487	—	—	
US	22	Palantir	Technology	469	—	—	
US	23	Chevron	Energy & materials	442	32.1	13.8	
US	24	Costco	Consumer	441	11.9	37.1	
US	25	Cisco	Technology	423	17.5	24.2	
China	1	Tencent	Communication & Internet	457	36.1	12.6	Private
China	2	China Construction Bank	Banks	450	54.3	8.3	SOE
China	3	CXMT	Technology	435	18.9	23.1	Ambiguous
China	4	Agricultural Bank of China	Banks	382	49.7	7.7	SOE
China	5	Bank of China	Banks	349	44.8	7.8	SOE
China	6	ICBC	Banks	338	59.7	5.7	SOE
China	7	Alibaba	Consumer	260	16.0	16.2	Private
China	8	Kweichow Moutai	Consumer	245	16.2	15.2	SOE
China	9	PetroChina	Energy & materials	228	37.8	6.0	SOE
China	10	China Mobile	Communication & Internet	214	24.3	8.8	SOE
China	11	China Merchants Bank	Banks	170	25.8	6.6	SOE
China	12	China Shenhua Energy	Energy & materials	160	13.1	12.2	SOE
China	13	CATL	Industrials	158	15.7	10.1	Private
China	14	Foxconn Industrial Internet	Technology	148	7.9	18.8	Private
China	15	CNOOC	Energy & materials	145	26.4	5.5	SOE

Country	Rank	Company	Sector	Market cap (US$ bn)	TTM earnings (US$ bn)	P/E	Ownership
China	16	China Life Insurance	Other financials	144	22.0	6.5	SOE
China	17	Ping An Insurance	Other financials	139	32.3	4.3	Private
China	18	Zijin Mining	Energy & materials	115	16.1	7.1	SOE
China	19	Zhongji Innolight	Technology	114	3.8	30.4	Private
China	20	PDD Holdings	Consumer	112	17.6	6.3	Private
China	21	BYD	Consumer	110	5.2	21.0	Private
China	22	Bank of Communications	Banks	109	14.6	7.5	SOE
China	23	China Yangtze Power	Utilities & real estate	108	5.1	21.2	SOE
China	24	Postal Savings Bank of China	Banks	101	10.2	9.9	SOE
China	25	Sinopec	Energy & materials	98	14.2	6.9	SOE

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